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1. Introductory 
The subject of the report is the document known as “Principles, Definitions and 
Model Rules of European Private Law” (“Draft Common Frame of Reference,” or 
“DCFR”).   The numbering used in this Executive Summary reflects the numbering 
used in the report.  The report considers the role and content of the DCFR from the 
perspective of Scots law.  The existing published edition of the DCFR is an interim 
outline edition.  An expanded version is due to be published by end 2008.   
 
2. Role and Function 
The DCFR is an academic initiative, the product of collaboration by two bodies: the 
Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law.  
It is intended to function as a “toolbox.”  This word encapsulates its function as a 
“bank” of terms and concepts to be used by European legislators.  It will help to 
ensure greater consistency and coherence of legislation in the European private law 
field.  At national level, it may act as an inspiration for national legislators.  In the 
future, the DCFR could perform more significant roles, either as an “opt-in” 
instrument which parties could adopt as the law governing their contracts, or as the 
basis for a European Contract Code.  The current version is insufficiently 
sophisticated to fulfil either of these latter two functions, and so they are not 
commented on in the report.   
 
The scope of the DCFR is wide, extending beyond the law of contract to include 
much of private law, for example, the law of unilateral promise and unjustified 
enrichment.   
 
3. General conclusions of the report  
The DCFR provides a welcome opportunity to develop Scots law into a more modern 
and coherent system of contract law.  Scots law is a “mixed” legal system, comprising 
civilian foundations overlaid with the influence of English law.  As such, Scots law  
contains many similarities to the DCFR, itself the product of collaboration between 
common and civilian lawyers.  The DCFR therefore offers to Scots law the 
opportunity for development in a manner that is consistent with the theoretical 
foundations of Scots law.   
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Good faith in contract law has been a central focus of debate in European contract law 
circles over the last ten years.  It is present (if at all) only in weak form in the Scottish 
(and English) legal systems. The most significant reference to good faith in the DCFR 
can be found in III – 1:103, which, generally, obliges parties to act in accordance with 
good faith and fair dealing in performing obligations or pursuing remedies.  The 
report analyses this article and concludes that it is relatively weak in nature.  Because 
of this, it is likely to be acceptable to Scots (and English) lawyers.   
 
5. The DCFR: beneficial aspects from a Scots perspective 
 
5.1 The DCFR offers modernised and rationalised contract terminology, 
preferable to existing Scots terminology in many cases.    
 
5.2 The DCFR’s carefully worked-out schemes are highly attractive in areas 
where there is little Scots law, for example, the law of services.  In these areas 
the DCFR rules could act as a “fall back” regime, applicable where the parties 
have not entered into a written contract.   
 
5.3 Parts of the DCFR display a high degree of resemblance to several un-enacted 
recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission.  In the future, the DCFR   
could act as a route for enacting these particular reforms.   
 
6. The DCFR from a consumer’s perspective  
The DCFR is significantly beneficial to consumers, both consolidating existing 
protections and extending protection into new areas.   
 
6.1 The scheme of consumer protection provided through existing European 
Directives is fragmented, and the terminology often inconsistent.  The 
“toolbox” function of the DCFR will ensure consistency in new consumer 
protection Directives. This will be of significant benefit to consumers.   
 
6.2 In its information duties, the DCFR consolidates and extends measures of a 
consumer protection nature contained in existing Directives, applicable, for 
example, where the consumer contracts at a distance, probably using the 
internet.  One criticism of this part of the DCFR is the failure clearly to 
delineate the duties applicable in business to business (“B2B”) contexts from 
those applicable in business to consumer (“B2C”) contexts.    
 
6.3 The DCFR includes rules on non-discrimination which have no equivalent in 
Scots law. The protections are comprehensive and balanced, and will be 
beneficial to consumers.    
 
6.4 The provisions of the DCFR on unfair terms are not yet agreed.  The more 
extensive formulation (which applies a fairness test to negotiated terms in 
addition to non-negotiated terms) would be more beneficial to consumers.     
 
7. The DCFR from a business perspective   
Parts of the DCFR may raise significant concerns for businesses.  Further consultation 
with stakeholders is required to discuss, in particular, the following issues:   
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7.1 Some parts of the DCFR impose such detailed obligations that they verge on 
over-regulation, an example being the rules on information duties. Although 
protective of consumers, the cost is increased administrative burdens for 
businesses. 
 
7.2 Although there will be gains for Scottish businesses through standardisation of 
terminology and concepts, some terms, and particularly the structure of the 
DCFR, will be unfamiliar to them.  This may limit its effectiveness as a 
“toolbox” at national Scottish level.    
 
7.3 The provisions of the DCFR on unfair terms are not yet agreed.  To apply the 
more extensive formulation (which applies a fairness test to negotiated in 
addition to non-negotiated terms) to a B2B context is likely to be wholly 
unacceptable to businesses.   
  
7.4 The information duties in the DCFR place an extensive burden on businesses.  
It is debatable whether they ought to have extended to B2B in addition to B2C 
contexts.  The DCFR also contains duties to negotiate in accordance with good 
faith and fair dealing. These duties are separate from the more general duty to 
perform obligations in accordance with good faith and fair dealing, imposed 
by DCFR III – 1:103, and commented on at 4 above.   Although an innovation 
on Scots law, the duties to negotiate in accordance with good faith in the 
DCFR are balanced, and address a clear need.  As a result, they are probably 
justifiable, even in a B2B context.     
 
7.5 The DCFR grants to the courts power to amend contract terms in certain 
circumstances.  Such powers are almost entirely absent from Scots (and 
English) law.  Although the powers contained in the DCFR are limited, they 
may still be unpopular with businesses, tending to undermine the reliance 
businesses place on the actual wording of the contract. 
 
7.6 The DCFR, in comparison to Scots (and English) law, permits a court to 
consider a wider class of evidence in order to interpret a contract.  This is 
likely to be unpopular with the business community because it tends to 
undermine the reliance businesses place on the actual wording of the contract.   
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